Management of Information Security: Challenges and Research Directions by Choobineh, Joobin et al.
Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 20 Article 57
December 2007
Management of Information Security: Challenges
and Research Directions
Joobin Choobineh
Texas A&M University, JChoobineh@mays.tamu.edu
Gurpreet Dhillon
Virginia Commonwealth University, g.dhillon-alumni@lse.ac.uk
Michael R. Grimaila
Air Force Institute of Technology
Jackie Rees
Purdue University
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Choobineh, Joobin; Dhillon, Gurpreet; Grimaila, Michael R.; and Rees, Jackie (2007) "Management of Information Security:
Challenges and Research Directions," Communications of the Association for Information Systems: Vol. 20 , Article 57.
DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.02057
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol20/iss1/57
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 20, 2007) 958- 971 958 
 
 
MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY:  
CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
Joobin Choobineh 
Information and Operations Management 
Texas A&M University 
JChoobineh@mays.tamu.edu 
 
Gurpreet Dhillon 
School of Business 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Michael R. Grimaila 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Jackie Rees 
Krannert Graduate School of Management 
Purdue University 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade management of information systems security has emerged to be a 
challenging task. Given the increased dependence of businesses on computer-based systems 
and networks, vulnerabilities of systems abound. Clearly, exclusive reliance on either the 
technical or the managerial controls is inadequate. Rather, a multifaceted approach is needed. In 
this paper, based on a panel presented at the 2007 Americas Conference on Information 
Systems held in Keystone, Colorado, we provide examples of failures in information security, 
identify challenges for the management of information systems security, and make a case that 
these challenges require new theory development via examining reference disciplines. We 
identify these disciplines, recognize applicable research methodologies, and discuss desirable 
properties of applicable theories. 
Keywords: management of security, research methods, desirable properties of theories 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, management of information security has mostly relied on technical control measures; 
however, research has shown that the majority of information security failures occur because of 
violations of controls by trusted personnel. This suggests that management of information 
security can only be adequately assured if the emphasis goes beyond technical controls and 
incorporates business process and organizational issues. Management of information security is 
primarily concerned with strategic, tactical, and operational issues surrounding the planning, 
analysis, design, implementation, and maintenance of an organization’s information security 
program.  Some of the most salient issues include asset valuation, auditing, business continuity 
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planning, disaster recovery planning, ethics, organizational communication, policy development, 
project planning, risk management, security awareness education/training, and various legal 
issues such as liability and regulatory compliance.   
In this paper, we document the discussions and findings that the authors identified during a panel 
presented at the 2007 Americas Conference on Information Systems held in Keystone, Colorado.  
The panel was formed after numerous discussions between the authors who recognized that 
information security management is a relatively immature discipline and that it requires additional 
academic study.  We believe that there is a growing need for research to verify/confirm the 
management challenges, discover current management deficiencies, identify best practices, 
devise methodologies, and specify requirements for the management of information security. In 
this paper, we provide examples of failures in information security, present some of the 
challenging issues in information security, and discuss emerging issues we have encountered in 
our experiences to provide motivation and directions for future research. 
II. THE MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY  
Information security management is the process of administering people, policies, and programs 
with the objective of assuring continuity of operations while maintaining strategic alignment with 
the organizational mission [Cazemier et al. 2000]. Ideally, information security management 
activities should be driven by organizational objectives so that no resources are expended on 
security without an explicit documented understanding of how it supports the organizational 
mission. Historically, information security management has been dealt with solely by establishing 
technical and physical controls. However, the increasing use, value, and dependence on 
computerized systems to support real world operations have increased the importance of 
incorporating process and organizational issues in security risk management [Drucker 1999; 
Blakley et al. 2001]. Information security risk management, the process used to identify the 
optimal protection strategy when constrained by a limited security budget, has evolved as a 
required function within organizations which are concerned with their ability to mitigate the effects 
of a breach of information security [Finne 2000].  Such breaches are referred to as “incidents.”  
Risk analysis, the first step of the risk management process, requires the identification and 
documentation of critical organizational resources (e.g., information, people, processes, and 
technologies) among a huge number of total information resources that are used to support the 
organizational mission. Determining criticality is not trivial. It requires an estimation of the value 
the resource provides to the organization based upon how it supports the organization’s strategic 
objectives [Mercuri 2005]. The scale and complexity of the organization, interdependencies 
between resources, and the dynamic nature of resource utilization greatly complicate value 
determination. However, an accurate resource valuation is essential as it directly impacts the 
quality of the decisions made during risk management [Finne 2000]. The valuation, in conjunction 
with an estimation of threats, vulnerabilities, and the likelihood (per unit time) of their intersection, 
is used to determine the potential damage to a resource, given the state of the organizational 
security capability [Gordon and Loeb 2002]. Collectively, this information provides the ability to 
rank order and address risks by risk avoidance (e.g., change processes), transference (e.g., 
outsource), mitigation (e.g., apply control measures), or acceptance (e.g., accept possible 
losses), commensurate with the value of the resource. 
Proper day-to-day and strategic management of information security operations are among 
critical success factors in achieving organizational goals. Pipkin [2000] identifies a cyclic, five-
phase process to conceptualize the information security management process: inspection, 
protection, detection, reaction, and reflection. The inspection phase requires the identification, 
valuation, and assignment of ownership of information assets critical to the organization; the 
protection phase requires the assignment of the control measures to protect critical information 
assets commensurate with their value; the detection phase requires the development of robust 
detection capabilities to insure that any breach of the organization is detected in a timely manner; 
the reaction phase requires that the organization has developed the resources and capabilities to 
quickly respond, contain, investigate, and remediate breaches; and the reflection phase requires 
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effective post-incident documentation, reporting, and accountability to assure institutional 
learning. Pipkin asserts that assuring organizational security requires consideration of all the five 
phases. Neglecting any one of the five phases can expose the organization to excessive losses 
when they inevitably experience an information incident. Unfortunately, as will be shown in the 
next section, organizations are not aware of, choose not to, or are not capable of implementing 
these phases in an effective and efficient manner. 
III. EXAMPLES OF FAILURES IN INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
In this section, we present two examples.  The first is an example of an actual incident. The 
second is hypothetical, though with a high likelihood of occurrence. These examples represent a 
small sample of the types of problems that can occur when managing an organizational 
information security program.  First, consider the May 2005 information security breach of 
CardSystems Solutions, Inc. (CSSI), a small credit card transaction processing company, located 
in Tucson, Arizona, that employed approximately 115 people [Consumer Affairs 2005; FTC 
Complaint 2006]. CSSI provided credit card transaction processing products and services to 
approximately 119,000 different merchants, enabling them to accept American Express, 
Discover, MasterCard, and VISA credit cards and debit cards as payment [House 2005]. At the 
time of the incident, CSSI was processing over 210 million transactions for approximately $15 
billion dollars per year. The breach was not detected by CSSI but instead by MasterCard, who 
had received complaints from affiliate banks that CSSI was the source of a potential fraud. A 
forensic investigation of the CSSI incident revealed that a database containing credit card 
information had been compromised nine months prior to the detection of the incident, which 
resulted in the theft of more than 40 million credit card records [Mimoso 2006]. This was quite 
remarkable, because CSSI had retained the credit card records in direct violation of the VISA 
Cardholder Information Security Program and their contractual agreements with VISA, 
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover. While at the time few details were released about 
the incident, it was revealed that CSSI information systems had been breached via its Internet 
facing Web server using a well-known security exploit called a Structured Query Language 
injection attack [Mimoso 2006]. The inability for CSSI to properly implement protection, detection, 
and reaction serves as a textbook example of the spectacular damage that can occur due to 
improper information security management. The fallout from the incident prompted congressional 
hearings; resulted in legal and regulatory actions; revealed problems related to accountability, 
auditing, due diligence, and notification; and demonstrated the consequences of failing to 
properly maintain an effective information security program. 
Even organizations that maintain a strong and effective security capability can suffer significant 
mission impact and loss if they do not explicitly document their information security risk 
management information [Fung et al. 2003; Grimaila and Fortson 2007]. Consider a hypothetical 
scenario that demonstrates the consequences that can occur when documentation aspects of 
information security management are not properly implemented. In this scenario, a deployed 
military organization is conducting an active military operation on foreign soil. One element of the 
operation requires the periodic delivery of supplies between facilities located in different parts of 
the country via ground vehicles. The commander of the logistics unit uses a logistics 
management program that stores the convoy routes and schedules in a network connected 
database. The local database is overloaded, so a system administrator decides to relocate the 
logistics database to a database server located in another organizational unit without 
documenting the change. As often occurs, access to the network is provided to a coalition partner 
to facilitate information sharing on an unrelated operation. Unfortunately, the coalition partner 
does not enforce stringent access control policies to the network. As a result, an adversary 
breaches the coalition partner’s system and uses it as a conduit to gain access to, and breach, 
the database server containing convoy routes and schedules. A short time later, the incident is 
detected and the adversary’s access to the database is terminated. An Incident Response Team 
(IRT) is dispatched to investigate the breach.  It finds the cause for the breach and begins to 
remediate the system. A key responsibility of the IRT is to notify organizations that have 
information stored on the system that their information might have been compromised. The 
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problem is that no explicit documentation exists which identifies all of the information owners who 
have information stored in the database. Over the next few days, the IRT reconstructs a list of 
information owners to notify them of the breach and to gain an understanding of the loss due to 
the unavailability of the system during remediation. Before the IRT can complete their 
investigation and notify the affected parties, one of the convoys whose schedule was listed in the 
database is ambushed, leading to a significant loss of life and loss of supplies. While the scenario 
presented is hypothetical, it reveals the consequences that can result from failing to implement a 
strict change management process, failing to sufficiently restrict access to partners, and failing to 
properly protect critical information resources. 
These examples illustrate the damage that can occur from information breaches and demonstrate 
opportunities for improvements in information security management. In the first case, if CSSI had 
properly implemented a vulnerability assessment and patching process, developed an intrusion 
detection capability, and/or periodically audited their information systems, they may have 
prevented (or mitigated) the breach. In the second case, if there were a mechanism to document 
information dependencies and insure that all information consumers who critically depended upon 
information were notified immediately when a breach occurs, the commander would have 
rerouted the convoy and prevented the ambush. In many cases, proven policies, procedures, and 
practices exist that can significantly mitigate or eliminate risks. However, organizations are often 
indifferent to, incapable of, or simply choose not to implement the required protective measures. 
The reasons why organizations fail to implement such measures when available appear to be 
extremely complex and require substantial research. In order to provide the rationale for the kinds 
of research that are needed, a deeper understanding of the challenges in the management of 
information security is required.   
IV. CHALLENGING ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
The management of information security faces three major challenges. First, even after decades 
of research in the theory and practice of IS security, its management is usually considered as an 
afterthought. Second, largely because security is considered as an afterthought, the problem of 
development duality creeps in. Third, conceptualizations of information security have largely been 
atheoretical. We believe that a focus on these three challenges will help in defining and 
addressing many of the problems in managing information security, as evidenced in the case 
examples in the previous section.  
IS SECURITY AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT 
The problem of information security being considered as an afterthought dates back to the era of 
checklists. Once a system has been implemented, it was a norm to follow a checklist to address 
whether any of the security ‘holes’ remained unplugged. While the information security 
community has recognized the inadequacy of checklists as a means to address security 
concerns, the checklist culture has, however, prevailed. Therein resides the problem of 
information security being considered as an afterthought. The lack of recognition of the 
importance of accounting for security during system and product development has resulted in 
little or no budget allocation for security. The result is that, if there is any security, it tends to be 
“bolted-in” rather than “baked-in.” 
Checklist culture in the era of risk analysis has perhaps done the most disservice to the 
information system and information security communities relative to the purist use of risk analysis. 
The purpose of risk analysis has always been defined as the product of the probability of 
occurrence of events and their cost. In order for risk analysis to be useful, it is important to 
identify assets that need to be protected, since any calculation of probability of occurrence of a 
negative event is in the context of assets that need to be protected. However, checklist culture 
forces one to identify and classify criticality of assets based on some predetermined list. At the 
same time, the classification of assets is largely vendor driven, without any consideration of the 
context of use. This results in risk analysis being applied to assets that have never been 
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compromised. Conventional wisdom from probability theory tells us that probability of occurrence 
of events can only be accurately calculated if there is data on occurrence of such events in the 
past. However, the prevalent checklist culture forbids this from happening. In the case of CSSI, 
this is what probably occurred. While the business was more interested in ensuring state of the 
art interfaces, security considerations emerged to be rather minimal, since many of the controls 
were checked, albeit based on old requirements.  
Checklists have also been prevalent in the evaluation of information security. While the ease of 
use and convenience in deployment of controls listed in the checklists cannot be disputed, there 
are concerns about lack of considerations for the context and the business processes within 
which the checklists are applied. Clearly there is a need to go beyond checklists and define 
information security requirements in terms of what may be required by the organization. This will 
help in considering information security as an enabler of business rather than a requirement that 
needs to be fulfilled.  
Had CSSI proactively evaluated their business environment and followed guidelines for archiving 
records, the breach would not have occurred. There is no doubt that good information security 
management can be achieved by proactively focusing on the quality of business processes rather 
than fulfilling requirements drawn for some checklist.  
DEVELOPMENT DUALITY AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
Development duality is a phenomenon where systems and security design are undertaken in 
parallel rather than in an integrated manner. This largely occurs when systems developers fail to 
recognize the security requirements at the onset of the development process.  
In the literature, it has been argued that development duality can be overcome if security 
considerations are addressed at the logical design phase of systems development [Baskerville 
1988] . This may be true, but one can argue that the real remedy of development duality is 
correctness of systems specification. In an ideal world, a correctly specified system should 
exactly model the real world. Therefore, requirements analysis is perhaps the most important 
stage of systems development, which provides input to the system specifications. Normally 
programmers tend to write code based on the requirements. This is where problems emerge. 
While it may make sense to take the complete set of requirements for developing the system, 
there is a significant semantic gap. It is therefore prudent to develop requirements for security 
policy that are based on the user requirements. This would be the first step in formally defining a 
high level security specification. A formal specification along with proper usability considerations 
feeds into the actual design of a system. Finally the actual code is written. By following a 
sequenced approach of this kind, it is possible to overcome development duality. Any failure to do 
so results in a semantic gap, which impacts the overall correctness in specification and hence the 
security of the system (see Fig 1).  
Semantic Domain
Syntactic Domain 1
Syntactic Domain2
A
B
Satisfies
Satis
fies
Figure 1. Correctness in Specification [based on Wing 1990] 
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Correctness in system specification is an important information security property.  It prevents 
development duality from creeping into systems design. While specifying systems, the syntactic 
domain (the logical structure of the program) needs to satisfy the semantic domain (the 
abstraction of reality). Many times, however, the syntactic domain may only appear to satisfy the 
semantic domain, as in the case represented in Figure 1. While syntactic domain “A” correctly 
satisfies what needs to be formalized within a universe of discourse, syntactic domain “B” does 
not. It just satisfies part of the semantic domain. Clearly, this leads to misspecification with 
ensuing errors [see Wing 1990].  
ATHEORETIC NATURE OF IS SECURITY METHODS AND TOOLS 
A theory is a logical explanation of interactions of a set of phenomena that are capable of 
predicting future occurrences or observations of the same kind. Over the past several decades, 
the field of information security management has suffered because of a lack of theoretical 
conceptualizations. While many researchers have offered interesting insights, there are as yet no 
well-established principles that define “good” information security management. There are 
multiple factors which conspire to make any research effort difficult. First, organizations are as 
unique as human beings are. As a consequence, results collected and generalized from one 
organization in a given domain do not always translate well into other domains or for other 
organizations. Second, organizations are organic, dynamic entities that change over time. This 
fact can often undermine or invalidate an otherwise sound security architecture if it is not 
adaptive. Finally, the best policies, procedures, and practices will have little or no value if they are 
not followed. Many organizations have developed great guidance but fail to periodically audit their 
implementation and operational use. Even worse is when the consequences of committing a 
policy violation are not enforced, which is analogous to police never patrolling the highway for 
speeders. When this occurs, an organization may falsely believe that it is secure while its 
intellectual properties, trade secretes, and other assets are vulnerable and subject to be 
compromised. These factors have prevented IS security research from being cumulative.  
These three challenges provide a significant number of opportunities for the researchers to leave 
their imprint upon the burgeoning stream of research on information security management. 
V. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
As a subfield of information systems discipline, information security management is still in its 
infancy.   Practitioners and academics are clamoring for greater understanding of the problems 
presented by information security and assurance activities and more acutely, solutions to those 
problems. Therefore, there are tremendous opportunities for new and current researchers to 
make a significant impact on the field. 
An ongoing area of inquiry is the relationship between information security risk management 
practices and other areas of risk management within the firm, or enterprise-wide risk 
management. For example, should there be a relationship between the activities undertaken in 
managing information-related risks and financial or legal risks? Given the increasing role of state 
and federal legislation regarding sensitive data losses in organizations, the need for alignment 
between legal and information risk management processes seems clear. However, there seems 
to be little in the way of organizational theory that would characterize this relationship. In practice, 
very few firms appear to position information security and assurance processes as part of the 
overall enterprise risk-management activities. Whether or not this is ideal is an open question. 
Certainly, the risk-management approach to information security provides for the characterization 
of the rewards, or benefits of using sensitive data and information for decision making. However, 
in order to better balance this risk-reward equation, we need to better understand the nature of 
the risks involved and the activities undertaken to manage those risks. (We assume for the 
purposes of this paper that the rewards are well documented and appreciated.)  Several 
researchers have tried to examine the risk assessment process itself, particularly in terms of the 
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common challenges faced by managers in approaching and executing the process [Baskerville 
and Portougal 2003; Sun, Srivastava, and Mock, 2006]. The attitudes, technologies, behaviors, 
and other phenomena are incorporated into the risks and activities under consideration. In order 
to fully appreciate these risks and the management of them, we need to step back and carefully 
examine the theories available within the reference disciplines of economics, strategic 
management, organizational behavior, psychology, and other potential sources for application to 
the security management problem. 
REFERENCE DISCIPLINES AND EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH 
Many reference discipline theories and/or frameworks that have been used or explored in the 
security context.  These include economics, strategic management, psychology, deterrence 
theory, theory of planned behavior, resource based view (RBV) of the firm, rational choice theory, 
high reliability theory, normal accident theory, social control theory, agency theory, game theory, 
complexity theory, and cognitive dissonance theory. Certainly others are plausible.  
Researchers have been delving into economic theories as they apply to managing the risks 
inherent in information management. Ross Anderson is often credited for initializing this stream of 
research [Anderson 2001; Gordon 2006]. Gordon and Loeb [Gordon and Loeb 2002] published 
the first economic analysis for rational investments in information security controls, making some 
headway against the Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) practice which is still common in the 
actual practice of security management. Other researchers, for example, August and Tunca  
[2006] examined network software security, particularly patching behaviors, within a game-
theoretic environment. Managing intrusion detection systems from the firm value perspective was 
the focus of other research [Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2005]. Gal-Or and Ghose  
[2005] also used game theory to study the effects of information sharing among firms for 
managing information security risks. We need to encourage further exploration of this domain as 
economics clearly is a strong motivating force in the actions and responses of firms, as well as 
attackers.  
There is also a need to explore and assimilate theories from the strategic management literature. 
There exists a long history of theories, such as the behavioral theory of the firm [March and 
Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963] and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm [Wernerfelt 
1984], that seek to explain firm behavior which will be vital to better understanding the security 
requirements and potentially effective responses of firms in managing their information risk. 
Finally, there is a strong need to continue the survey of the psychology, sociology, and criminal 
justice literatures in terms of organizing and better understanding not only the criminal element of 
information risk but also the individual and employee role in information risk management. Some 
of the earliest work in the field [Straub and Collins 1990; Straub and Nance 1990; Goodhue and 
Straub 1991; Harrington 1996; Straub and Welke 1998] draws theoretical grounding from these 
disciplines. Further progress in this area has been made by Dhillon and Torkzadeh [2006], with 
the use of value focused thinking for strategizing about information security objectives. The 
strategy literature has significantly been influenced by sociology, so it seems prudent to delve into 
the sociological paradigms to inform information security theory development. Some initial 
guidelines have been provided by Dhillon and Backhouse [2001]. As more emphasis is placed on 
employees and other insiders being the “weakest link,” particularly as there is more interest from 
attackers on social engineering types of attacks, we will need much additional research into how 
to better manage this segment of the information security chain. 
There is a substantial need to scrutinize current “best practices.” Best practices are often created 
using a “one size fits all” mentality which fails to account for organizational differences.  These 
practices need to be assessed in terms of the theories catalogued above and then tested, both 
analytically and empirically as relevant. We also need to consider what linkages, if any, exist 
between security activities and corporate strategy, enterprise risk management, business 
intelligence, and knowledge management. For example, could security ever lead to a competitive 
advantage for firms outside the security product and service space? There also exists a need to 
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focus on the pressing issue of quickly securing the integration of new technologies into the 
organization, particularly wireless and mobile technologies. We also need to consider supply 
chain and virtual organizations. 
Information security and assurance policies are the “vehicle” for managing the identified risks to 
the organization. However, there is a great deal of unknown regarding the proper management 
and use of security policies. More specifically, are there ideal designs for security policies in 
organizations? Are there tested guidelines for developing and implementing security policies that 
are tied to theory? When do we retire security policies? A few researchers are looking into this 
issue [Doherty and Fulford 2005]. Again, an inherently interdisciplinary approach is required. 
Insider threat is another interesting problem that requires more research. While there have been 
great strides for protecting systems from outside threats, only modest work has been conducted 
on defending against the malicious insider [Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson 2005]. Are 
certain organizations more susceptible to insider threat? Are certain types of employees more 
susceptible to succumbing to temptation, opportunity, and so on? How can managers, security 
practitioners, and human resource professionals design and implement more effective programs 
to better manage this threat? 
Additional research is also needed to explore successful security programs.  Why are certain 
firms able to effectively implement and execute business continuity plans, which encompass 
various aspects of information security, whereas other firms struggle to do so in the face of 
various incidents affecting information assets? Why have organizations resisted implementing 
new technologies or improving procedures when it is so clear in hindsight, if not beforehand, that 
disastrous consequences are nearly inevitable? For example, the CSSI incident, where data was 
not deleted in violation of protocol, raises questions of why procedures were not followed. Was it 
purely a matter of economics? Overly optimistic thinking? Systems complexity overwhelming the 
information processing capabilities of managers? Lack of education and training? 
POSITIONING OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
Various methodologies can be and have been applied in conducting research in this field.  Among 
others, these include analytics, empirical, lab experiments, and simulation.  In addition, there still 
is a strong need for theory clarification and aggregation. The field is not mature enough to 
exclude any particular methodological approaches. There is definitely an opportunity to build 
theory here, and we explicitly invite our colleagues versed in qualitative techniques to add 
assistance here. 
There are a growing number of analytical papers from the economics of information systems 
community. As mentioned earlier, a number of papers using game theory have been published in 
this arena, for example, August and Tunca [2006], Gal-Or and Ghose [2005], and Cavusoglu et 
al. [2005]. These papers are vital as they are attempting to link firm financial issues to security-
related topics. These papers are important not only for understanding the economic phenomena 
surrounding information security in organizations but also for providing motivation for corporate 
funding for ongoing research. More analytical research with respect to quantitative managerial 
model analysis needs to be executed. Decision support in terms of statistical analysis, machine 
learning, and heuristics are all vital for today’s managers working in a dynamic and complex 
environment. Hamill and colleagues adopted a value-focused thinking approach [Hamill, Deckro, 
and Kloeber 2005] for evaluating and assessing information assurance strategies. Genetic 
algorithms were used to match software vulnerabilities to specific security technology profiles 
[Gupta, Rees, Chaturvedi, and Chi 2006]. A risk-management approach to security investments 
has also been tried [Yue, Cakanyildirim, Ryu, and Liu 2007]. 
There is certainly a need for continued empirical work. We have seen a number of event studies 
published within the domain.  However, many unanswered and conflicting results call for further 
and deeper research into this area. There is a growing interest in adoption and diffusion studies 
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of technologies, policies, and certifications. These studies should be encouraged, as they could 
have important policy implications for researchers and practitioners. 
There have been few lab experiments performed via the experimental economics tradition. 
Depending on the framing of the research question, students may be sufficient proxies for 
employees and certainly for average home users. Certainly, in-depth field research, while difficult, 
expensive, and time-consuming, is needed. Another possibility is to incorporate “nonobvious” 
data sources. Are there security implications for organizations through employee use of 
FaceBook and MySpace? What about blogging or Second Life? Certainly, discussion boards and 
blogs have been of concern from a marketing and brand perspective, hence the creation of 
reputation management services.  The Department of Defense has recognized these risks. On 
May 11, 2007, U.S. Army Commander General B.B. Bell signed a directive prohibiting access to 
13 popular culture sites for operational security reasons [Associated Press 2007]. Are competitors 
able to locate more information about organizations on the Web than is prudent? What research 
opportunities do these media present to researchers, especially those working with large data 
sets or in knowledge discovery settings? 
Finally, simulation has an important role to play.  As we become more and more adept at agent-
based simulation methods, these methods should find a role in scenario planning, validation and 
verification. 
DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF INFORMATION SECURITY THEORIES 
The previous discussion emphasized the urgent need to identify existing applicable theories in 
the various reference disciplines as well as formulating security-specific theories in order to 
inform current and future research. Any theory identified or formulated needs to adhere to the 
following criteria:   
• Consistency. Consistency refers to the property where all premises hold in the model.  
That is, the model proves that the theory is consistent. Usually any arbitrary model of a 
theory is sufficient to prove its consistency. However, in practice, it makes sense to find 
more natural models of the theory, meaning that we examine various models and assess 
if they conform to the mental models of a theory. This helps in safeguarding against not 
so obvious inconsistencies (e.g., inconsistencies because the background knowledge 
remains implicit). 
• Soundness. Any theory presupposes assumptions grounded on the substantive field. 
One of the major challenges in developing a theory is to define the assumptions that 
need to be included. This requires a deep understanding of the field. Soundness refers to 
the ability to ground assumptions in the literature such that implicitly the theory makes 
sense. 
• Falsifiability. A theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable [Popper 1959]. The attempt 
therefore is to find a model (or framework) in which the definitions hold and the 
assumptions (or a theorem) are false.   
• Satisfiability/Contingency. The notion of satisfiability is one where the models or 
frameworks are true for the definitions and the assumptions. In such cases the empirical 
claims can be either corroborated or refuted.  
• Experience Explication.  An information security theory ought not to be just an opinion as 
to how security might exist in an organization. Rather it should be an attempt at 
formulating the meaning of its existence. This would be done by explicating the content of 
some very definitive experiences. Such experiences would obviously have to be logically 
classified and interpreted. The argument of such a theory would not be arbitrary, but it 
would derive its validity from the aggregate of experiences.  Such a theory should invoke 
or suggest occurrence of parallel experiences, which in many ways would be an empirical 
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test of the truth of a theory. If a theory is unable to identify some sort of an explication of 
experiences, then at best the theory may be considered irrelevant or it may be rejected.  
A careful consideration of these criteria facilitates systematic development of theory that helps in 
explaining and predicting occurrences. Such a theory is needed for information security. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Modern organizations are heavily dependent on their computerized information systems for their 
low-level day-to-day operations, high-level strategic decision-making process, and all the 
administration functions in between these two. Given this dependency, organizations have 
become increasingly vulnerable to attacks through their networks and their information systems. 
Proper management of information security has become a very important consideration.  As this 
paper was developed from a panel discussion, the comments from the members of the audience 
further underscored the importance of addressing the various problems of information security 
from a multitude of perspectives. Audience members ranged from seasoned researchers looking 
for new research questions to practitioners transitioning into academia.  The questions ranged 
from potential publication outlets to working more closely with industry in identifying and 
addressing problems of interest.  It appeared quite clear that everyone in the room was in 
agreement that information security is not only a technical issue, best left to our computer science 
and engineering colleagues, but is a risk management and business process issue, that must be 
viewed through multiple lenses. 
In order to properly address this issue, we have identified three relevant management problems. 
These are: 1) addressing security after the system has been developed, resulting in an overall 
less secure system; 2) parallel design of security and information systems; and 3) lack of theories 
in the development of solutions to these problems. This identification provides a fertile ground for 
development and testing of new theories. We suggested various reference disciplines for this 
development. Among others, these include economics, game theory, strategic management, 
psychology, sociology, and criminology. Research methodologies for developing and testing the 
theories could vary widely from ethnographical methods to various types of experiments. The 
most important consideration in developing the theories is that they should explain at least one 
and preferably a collection of similar experiences in the field. This requires deep understanding of 
real world security management problems followed by their classification, categorization, and 
attribution. It is clear to us that opportunities for research in the information system security 
domain will continue to grow as our dependence on information technology grows. 
DISCLAIMER 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or 
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